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DEFINING THE LIMITS OF WETLAND REGULATION
UNDER THE CWA AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
United States v. Wilson'

by Stephen S. Davis
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme
Court declared in 1985 that federal agencies could regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable waterways under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), federal courts have
seemed puzzled as to how far to
extend wetland regulation. The
Court's decision in U.S. v. Lopez
renewed concerns about the limits
of permissible wetland regulation
under the Commerce Clause, since
not all wetlands are or lie adjacent
to navigable waterways. In US v.
Wilson, the Fourth Circuit has now
held that wetlands not adjacent to
interstate waters may not be regulated under the CWA. This decision directly contradicts pre-Lopez
rulings and receives criticism because of Lopez's unpopularity
among courts. U.S. v. Wilson
therefore would have represented
an opportunity for the Supreme
't133
FF3dr25t
2

Limits of Wetland Regulation
River and consists of about 4,000
developed acres with a population
of 33,000 people at present.'
When completed, the development
will cover more than 9,000 acres
and have 80,000 residents.' The
city was created pursuant to the
New Communities Act of 1968 as
a collaboration between Interstate

Court to clarify its Commerce

and the U.S. Department ofHous-

Clause jurisprudence and resolve
the issue ofwetland regulation under the CWA. Unfortunately, the
United States chose not to appeal
the Fourth Circuit's decision,

ing and Urban Development
IThe agreement between
Interstate and HUD reserved portions of St. Charles for parks,
schools, and recreational areas, and
also set aside 75 acres of wetlands
near the Zekiah Swamp.' As required, Interstate and HUD prepared an Environmental Impact
Statement for St. Charles, but the
statement did not mention any specific plan for development of
Wilson's land within the wetland
area. This statement also did not
constitute a permit under the CWA
for development of the wetland in
question.'
Evidence introduced at trial
indicated that Wilson violated federal regulations by draining four
parcels of land classified as wetlands.' 0 Wilson drained the area by
both digging drainageditchesto allow for run-offand buding up the

11.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1996, a jury convicted
James J. Wilson along with two
firms he controlled, Interstate General ("Interstate") and St. Charles
Associates, offourfelony counts of
knowingly discharging fill material
and excavated dirt into wetlands
without a permit.I Wilson has been
a land developer for over 30 years
and was declared responsible for
both finns' activities from which this
dispute arose. 3 The development at
issue was located in the planned
community of St. Charles, Maryland.' St. Charles is situated in
Charles County between the
Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac

1997).

C4ithCir.
Wilson was CEO and Chairman ofJJames
the Board of Interstate General Co. L.P. a publicly traded land detolopment
company with 340 employees, 2f000 shareholders, and assets of over 100 million, interstate General was the general partner

of St. Charles Associates, L.P., the firm which owned the land being de%eloped within St. Charles, Maryland U1Ison, 133 F3d
at 254.
4

1d.

'Id
6
M.
'1d
8
1d
9
1d.
'kwdi
at 254-55.
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land by depositing truck loads of
fill material over it." The dirt removed in the digging process was
deposited next to the ditches, in a
process termed "sidecasting."
The Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps"), the agency with regulatory authority over wetlands under
the CWA, charged the defendants
with violating rules prohibiting wetland pollution without a permit.1"
One issue at trial was
whether the parcels should be classified as wetlands. The government
introduced "substantial" evidence
that the area was in fact a wetland.14

vegetation." The Corps also demonstrated that water from the land
flowed in a drainage pattern through
intermittent streams and creeks to

the Potomac River, emptying into
the Chesapeake Bay.'6 Finally, the
government introduced evidence
supporting its claim that Wilson
acted knowingly, the mens rea required for conviction under the relevant regulations.'"
Wilson introduced evidence questioning the government's
assertion that the parcels in question were in fact wetlands under the
CWA. This evidence included inAccording to the National Wet- consistent actions ofthe Corps conlands Inventory Map and other to- cerning the land and an intra-agency
pographical maps, the area was a memorandum questioning the
wetland. In addition, testimony and classification ofthe area as wetlands
photographs proved the presence under the Act.'" After deliberating
of standing water and vegetation for 15 hours, the jury returned a
typical ofwetland areas, and infra- verdict for the government.19
In appealing his conviction,
red aerial photographs showed a
pattern ofwater currents under the Wilson argued that the regulation he

allegedly violated was ultra vires, in
that it extended the application of
the CWAs definition of waters under the Corps' jurisdiction to the
parcels ofland in controversy. Specifically, Wilson claimed that defining "waters of the United States"
as any waters whose "degradation
'could affect' interstate commerce"
improperly reached the parcels because it violated the Commerce

Clause.20 He asserted that allowing the jury to justify regulation of
interstate commerce by basing it on
activities that "could affect" interstate commerce afforded the government practically limitless authority and offended the U. S. Supreme
Court's recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 2' The Fourth Circuit
Court ofAppeals set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial,
holding that the underlying regulation exceeded Congress' delegation
of authority under the CWA in that

"Id at 254.
121d.

"Id. at 255. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(2)(A). The Corps andthe EPA share responsibility for administering and
enforcing the CWA. The EPA has authority to seek penalties for discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States
without a permit in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311. The EPA can issue an order requiring compliance with the Act, bring a civil
action for injunctive relief and penalties, or seek administrative relief. The Corps has authority to issue permits to discharge
dredged or fill materials into water covered by the Act. The Corps follows the guidelines established by the EPA in issuing
permits. The Corps also has authority to enforce violations of these permits, and the EPA has a veto power over the issuance
of permits when it determines, after consulting with the Corps, that the dredging or fill materials "will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds. . .wildlife, or recreational areas." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). See Hoffman
Homes, 961 F 2d at note 2. infra note 54.
'4 ilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
"Id at 254.
'61d at 254-55.
"Id. at 255. The evidence demonstrated that Wilson made extra efforts in constantly draining and re-draining the land,
shoring up the land through the addition of hundreds of truckloads of filler, and fighting off reappearing wetland vegetation.
In addition. a private consulting firm advised Wilson to apply for a permit from the Corps before beginning development. The
zoning commission in Charles County also contacted Wilson regarding its concerns that he was developing in a wetland
area. Finally, even after Wilson complied with a Corps order to cease development on the land in question, Wilson continued
to develop other parcels without notifying the Corps or seeking a permit for them. Id.
2

d.

' 0 Id. at 256.

it encompassed areas not under the
jurisdiction ofCongress pursuant to
its commerce power.22
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the
CWA pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause, but the
ambiguity of the Act's terms has
caused constitutional confusion.3
The Act prohibits discharges of
dredge or fill material without a permit into "navigable waters."24 The
Act defimes "navigable waters" as
"waters of the United States," an
undefined, troubling jurisdictional

Limits of Limits of Wetland Regulation
Subsequently, the Corps
phrase which does not clearly encompass wetlands." At first, the promulgated new rules defining
Corps, which administers section "waters ofthe United States."' The
404 of the Act - the section re- regulation included wetlands among
quiring permits for discharging those waters regulated.29 The rules
dredged and fill materials into navi- prohibited permitless discharges
gable waters - interpreted the term into wetlands adjacent to waters of
narrowly and promulgated rules the United States and, on a caseaccordingly, only prohibiting dis- by-case basis, non-adjacent wetcharges without a permit into bod- lands whose "degradation" could
ies of water that were truly navi- affect interstate commerce.3 0 The
gable and excluding wetlands from authority of Congress to regulate
regulation. 6 However, courts navigable waters under the Comstruck down these regulations be- merce Clause has long been upheld
cause they conflicted with the over- by the Supreme Court." The
present controversy arose because
all purpose of the Act.2 7

7Id at 256.
22

1d at 258. This Note deals exclusively with the Court of Appeals holding regarding the Commerce Clause and the regulation
of wetlands under the CWA. Not discussed are the felony violation issues of the Court's decision, such as the mens rea
requirement of the CWA regulations and the associated jury instruction issue. For treatment of felony violations of CWA
provisions, see the following: Richard J.Lazarus, Mens Rea in EvironmentalCriminalLaw: Reading Supreme Court 7ea
Leaves, 7 FORDmI ~ENv-. L.J. 861 (1996); Patrick W Ward, Comment. The CriminalProvisionsofthe CI-A as Interpretedby
the Judiciaryand the Resulting Responsefrom the Legislature, 5 DICK. J. ENvn. L. & POLY 399 (1996): and Christine L.
Wettach, Mens Rea and the "HeightenedCriminalLiability - Imposed on Tliolators of the CW-4. 15 STAN. ENrLu. L.J. 377

(1996).
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2433 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
25
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A) and 33 C.FR. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993). For a more complete description of the regulatory
development of wetlands under the CWA, see George K. Chamberlin, Annot.. What are "Navigable Maters "Subject to the
23

Provisionsofthe FederalWater Pollution Contro/Act, asAmended. 52 A.L.R.FED. 788 (198 1); Elaine Bueschen, Comment,
Do Isolated WetlandsSubstantiallyAffectInterstateCommerce?. 46 Am. U. L.REv. 931. 935 (1997). J. Blanding Holman.After
UnitedStates v Lopez: Can the CWJA and the EndangeredSpeciesActSurviveCommerce ClauseAttack?, 15 VA. ENrIL. L.J.
139, 165 (1995); StephenM. Johnson, FederalRegulation oflsolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTm. L. 1. 9 (1993) and John A. Leman.
The Birds: Regulation oflsolated Wetlands and the Limits ofthe Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAvis L.REV. 1237. 1244 (1995).
26Johnson,

supra note 25, at 10.
at 360 (citing U.S. v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974), and Natural Resources Defense Councilv.
Callaway. 392
F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975)).
UId at 11-12. See also 42 Fed Reg. 37,122 (1977).
29
Johnson, supra note 25, at I1-12.
301d.
The regulation at issue in Wilson defines "waters of the United States" to include: "All other waters such
as intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mud flats, sand flats, wetlands. sloughs. prairie potholes. wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce." 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (1993). See 1ilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57.
4See U.S. v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23 (1967) (quoting Gilman v.Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713. 724-25 (1865)). In Gilman, the
Court stated that "[tihe Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable
waters. 'The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose. and to the extent necessary, of all the
navigable waters of the United States . S..
."ee il/son, 133 F.3d at 256.
27

1d
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ofthe regulation's expansion ofthe
reach of the Act from navigable
waters to all waters of the United
States, including those waters
whose "degradation 'could affect'

ously applied to pollution control
In Leslie Salt,the Court of
statutes in order to regulate "at least Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
some waters that would not be that a wetland lying a quarter-mile
deemed 'navigable' under the clas- from the Newark Slough, a tidal arm
sical understanding ofthat term." 7 ofthe San Francisco Bay, could be
interstate commerce." 32
Thus, the Court concluded, it was regulated under the CWA. 4 1 The
In 1985, the Supreme reasonable for the Corps of Engi- land at issue fell under the Act even
Court dealt with the authority of neers to construe the term "waters though its characteristics as a wetCongress to regulate navigable of the United States" as encom- land arose through artificial means. 42
waters under the CWA in U.S. v. passing wetlands that are adjacent In the early part of the century,
Riverside Bayview Hvmes, Inc. 3 to what are commonly considered Leslie Salt Company's predecesIn that case, the Court upheld the navigable waters."
sor in interest excavated pits for
Corps' definition of"waters ofthe
Since the subject in contro- depositing calcium chloride and
United States," which included wet- versy in RiversideBayview Homes other pits for crystalizing salt. 3 Salt
lands adjacent to navigable wa- was an adjacent wetland, the Su- production later ceased in the late
ters.M The Corps filed suit to halt a preme Court left open the issue of 1950s, but the pits remained.'
housing development because the whether CWA regulations govern These pits filled with rainwater durdeveloper did not have the requi- non-adjacent wetlands." A few ing the rainy season, but wetlandsite permits to dredge and fill the years after the Riverside Bayview type vegetation did not grow for
land." The Court limited its discus- Homes decision, the issue of iso- years because ofthe land's high salt
sion to adjacent wetlands because lated wetlands emerged in two content.4 ' The government later
the wetland at issue bordered the cases before the federal courts of constructed a sewer line and pubBlack Creek, a navigable water- appeals. The first case, Leslie Salt lic roads in and around the propway, and the wetland had ground- Co. v U.S., was heard by the Ninth erty that created culverts connectwater connections with other bod- Circuit; the other, Hoffman ing the land to the Newark
ies of water.' The Court stated that Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, Slough.' The area also became
in using the term "navigable" in the U.S. Environmental Protection reachable to ocean tidal backflow
CWA, Congress "evidently in- Agency, arose in the Seventh Cir- when the state highway agency detended to repudiate limits" previ- cuit.40
stroyed a tidegate on neighboring
32

filson. 133 F.3d at256.
474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).

33

4RiversideBawiewHones, 474 U.S. at 133.
d.

35
36

Id at 131.
1d at 132-33.

37

3

1d at 133.

39Id at 131, n.8. The Court expressed. "We are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps to
regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water ... and we do not express any
opinion on that question." Id. See also Johnson, supra note 25 at 19.
"0See Leslie Salt, infra note 41. and Hoffman Homes. infra note 55.

4 tLeslie
42

Salt Co. v U.S.. 896 F2d354, 355 (9th Cir. 1990).

ld at 355.
43
1d.
4
4Id.
45
Id.
4

1d. at 356.
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land." When Leslie began efforts

to drain the land in the mid-I 980s,
the Corps issued a cease and desist order under § 404 of the
CWA.48
The court explained that
government jurisdiction would include the wetland at issue if it fell

States. Congress intended to

adjacency and interstate commerce
regulate local aquatic ecosys- issues, for even an isolated wetland
tems regardless oftheir origin."o with no natural, hydrological con-

nection to a navigable water fell
under the Act's jurisdiction.'
changed the nature of the wetland
The Seventh Circuit's holdfrom isolated to adjacent, the court ing in Hoffman Homes can be dispermitted regulation, provided that tinguished from the Ninth Circuit's
within the scope of Congress' au- there was a sufficient connection decision in Leslie Salt. The
thority to regulate interstate com- between the land and interstate Hoffman Homes court held that the
merce.49 The court rejected Leslie's commerce." The court directed EPA lacked jurisdiction under the
argument that government intrusion that jurisdiction would be proper CWA to regulate an isolated wetshould not create government ju- under the Commerce Clause if the land." This case involved an onerisdiction under the CWA, stating: land provided a habitat for either eighth acre piece of land with a
migratory birds or an endangered bowl-shaped depression that often
[t]he fact that third parties, in- species, as the Environmental Pro- collected rainwater.56 In 1986, a
cluding the government, are tection Agency ("EPA") regulations Corps employee happened to drive
responsible for flooding Leslie's instructed." It gave no reasoning for by the site and notice that it was
land is irrelevant. The Corps' this finding." In so ruling, the Court being developed." Upon investigajurisdiction does not depend on demonstrated that it would go to tion, the EPA and the Corps deterhow the property at issue be- great lengths to defer to the Corps' mined that the area was an intracame a water of the United interpretation ofthe CWA, both on state wetland, and that dredging and
Because the government acts

47Id.
48

1d

49

1d at 357.
old. at 358.
"Id at 357-58. The district court held that the government intrusions could not create government jurisdiction. To allow this
would be to allow the Corps to "expand its own jurisdiction by creating some wetland conditions where none existed before."
Id.at 357.
52
1d. at 360. The Corps introduced evidence that the land was a habitat for migratory birds who used the pits when they were
flooded during the winter and spring. The Corps also showed that the salt marsh harvest mouse, an endangered species.
inhabited the area.
53Id. The Court did cite cases to back up its decision, e.g., Utah v. Marsh. 740 F.2d 799. 804 (10th Cir. 1984):
Palila v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F2d495 (9th Cir. 1981); and Hughes v Oklahoma., 441 U.S. 322, 329-36 (1979).
mId. After asserting that the wetland could be classified as adjacent to navigable waters and, therefore. that the issue was not
a bar to the Corps' jurisdiction, the Court explained that it was still necessary to determine whether the crystallizers and pits
have sufficient connections to interstate commerce to be regulated Id. The Court remanded this issue to the district court. Id.
It instructed that jurisdiction may extend if the district court finds that the area was a habitat for migratory birds or endangered species, as the EPA regulations provide. Id. On remand, the district court found this to be the case and extended
jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals' previous decision was not clearly
erroneous, and thus., did not warrant reconsideration. See generallyLeslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
"Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
"Id at 258.

"Id. at 257.
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filling the area without a permit was
a violation of the CWA.5 ' It was not
disputed that the area had no surface or groundwater connection to
any other body of water, was not
used for any interstate commerce
function, such as fishing or industrial use, nor was it visited by interstate travelers for recreational or
other purposes." The EPA argued

that the area fell under CWA jurisdiction solely because migratory
birds could potentially use the area

for feeding, nesting or resting before moving on to other states. 0
There was no evidence, however,
that any migratory birds actually
used the site.'

The Corps, under the direction ofthe EPA, denied Hoffman
5 Id
at 258.

a retroactive pernnit for filling and
dredging the land and filed an administrative complaint against the
company when it refused to restore

Court of Appeals, which found in
its favor on the merits.' Later, however, the court granted the EPAs
motion for rehearing and vacated
the land to its original condition.6 2 its decision." Upon rehearing, the
An EPA administrative law judge court once again overruled the
("AL") concluded that the area CJO's decision, but only discussed
was, in fact, a wetland within the the Commerce Clause issue in
meaning of the CWA and its regu- dicta.67
lations, but that the EPA did not
In its final 1993 decision,
have authority to regulate it, since the Seventh Circuit Court
of Apthe area had no effect on interstate peals held that the potential prescommerce.63 The EPA's Chief Ju- ence of migratory birds was indeed
dicial Officer ("CJO") reversed the enough to tie an isolated wetland
AL's decision, finding that the EPA to interstate commerce so that it
had authority under the Act to regu- could be regulated."8 However,
late intrastate wetlands that had a since the EPA had furnished an un"minimal, potential effect" on inter- substantial amount of evidence to
state commerce.' Hoffman then establish that the area
was a poappealed to the Seventh Circuit

59

Id.
1d at 259.
61id.
62
Id at 258.
60

"d at 258-59.

Hoffman Homes. Inc. v Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). In this opinion, the
court held that the EPA could not regulate an intrastate wetland that did not affect interstate commerce. According to the
EPA, even isolated wetlands fall under its regulatory jurisdiction if "the use, degradation, or destruction" of the wetland
"could affect interstate commerce." Id at 1313 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(a)(3)). The court examined the language of the
statute. its legislative history: and its stated policy objectives in deciding whether to uphold the EPA's interpretation of it
under the Chevron doctrine. Id Itfound the language of the statute ambiguous with respect to wetlands in general, that the
1972 and 1977 legislative history failed to support regulation of isolated wetlands, and that the Act's stated policy objectives
did not evidence an intent to regulate isolated wetlands. Id at 1316. The Hoffman Homes court also interpreted Riverside
Baview Homes as denying regulation of isolated wetlands. Id. at 1314 (quoting Riverside BaviewHomes, 474 U.S. at 131,
n.8). The court also discussed wetland regulation under the Commerce Clause. Id at 1317. It asserted that an isolated
wetland, by definition, has no effect on interstate waters and that the EPA had produced no evidence showing that the
wetland affected interstate commerce. Id at 1319-20. The EPA claimed that the potential use of the wetland by waterfowl in
the midst of interstate flight was sufficient to grant it jurisdiction. Id at 1320. The court rejected this argument, replying that
migratory birds, until they are "watched. photographed. shot at or otherwise impacted" by people engaging in interstate
commerce. do not "ignite the Commerce Clause." Id The court ruled that the "potential presence" of migratory birds does not
sufficiently support Commerce Clause regulation. Id
"See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency. 975 F 2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992).
67See Hoffman Homes. Inc. v Administrator. U.S. Emil. Protection Agency, 999 F 2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
65See

"'Hoffman Homes, 999 F 2dat 261-62.
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cept the regulation of non-navigable
tential habitat for migratory birds, it state commerce basis.
reversed the CJO's decision." AcTen years after Riverside waters to the extent that they subcording to the regulation, the EPA Bayview Homes,' the Supreme stantially affect the use, potential use
had regulatory jurisdiction over Court put limits on Congress' au- or instrumentalities of interstate
waters "which are or could be thorny under the Commerce Clause commerce.
taken," or "are used or could be in US. v. Lopez.7 ' The Court in
Scholars have been busy
used" for industrial purposes.'o The Lopez struck down the Gun-Free theorizing what effect Lopez will
court interpreted the word "could" School Zones Act of 1990, a crimi- have on wetland regulation under
in the regulation as the CJO had nal statute Congress enacted pur- the CWA 8 At least one scholar
done, that EPA jurisdiction extends suant to its authority under the believes that the decisions of the
to waters whose nexus to interstate Commerce Clause. 7 ' Because the Ninth and Seventh Circuits may be
commerce is only potential rather intrastate activity at issue in Lopez on shaky ground after Lopez."
than actual and "minimal rather than did not "substantially affect" inter- Because of Lopez, the Supreme
substantial." In dicta, the court state commerce, even in the aggre- Court may now view the connec
maintained that migratory birds af- gate if repeated elsewhere, the Su- tion between isolated wetlands and
fect interstate commerce. 72 Thus, preme Court ruled that the law was interstate commerce as so "tenuthe court explained that the poten- unconstitutional. 77 In the instant ous" as to say that such regulation
tial presence ofmigratory birds was case, the Fourth Circuit cited Lopez "seriously erode1s] the distinction
a sufficient connection to interstate for the proposition that Congress between local and national concommerce to grant the EPA juris- may regulate matters substantially cems."I In particular, the migratory
diction based on a reasonable in- affecting interstate commerce. 78 bird rule "does not guarantee" that
terpretation ofthe regulation.' But Thus, the Wilson court asserts that filling isolated wetlands substantially
the lack of substantial evidence on although the full reach ofCongress' affects interstate commerce. 83the
the migratory bird issue precluded power under the Commerce Clause migratory bird rule as insufficient to
the court from ruling on an inter- remains unclear, courts should ac- confer regulatory authority under
69
1d at 262.
71

7d.at 26 1.

id.

72Md.

The court cited U.S. v.Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204(71h Cir. 1979). holdingthat Congress may regulate activities that"affect
interstate commerce, and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and the Inthdistn
Migratory Bird Conservation Act, passed b Congress in
unosiutoa3
1918 and 1929 respectively, showing congressional regulation of and interest in protecting migratory birds.
73

1d.

74474 U.S. 121 (1985).

7'514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7
514 U.S. at 558-59.
77

1d

7

LLopeZ,

at 567.
133 F.3d at 255-56.

79

1d

n saItSOn,
In 1997 the Supreme Court issued its decision in Prinz v. U.S. 117 S.Ct. 2365. Although that case dealt with regulation

of interstate commerce. it primarily concerned such regulation in conjunction with state sovereignty issues. It. therefore.
does not significantly add to a discussion of federal regulation of wetlands when no state executive authority is involved.
supra note 25.

, supra note 2e5. at 168.
at 195.

diSee

stHoaman
p

edC
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There are two concerns
that the Supreme Court would view
the Commerce Clause." First,
Congress has not made explicit
findings that the filling of isolated
wetlands substantially affects interstate commerce." Were Congress
to do so, the Supreme Court would
likely defer to the legislature's reasoning, even under Lopez. In
Lopez, the Court found no economic activity inherent in carrying a
handgun in a city school. On the
contrary, congressional regulation of
the nation's waters as well as
agency regulation of wetlands have
become historic practices and
gained approval by the Supreme
Court. 6 Secondly, migratory birds
are a "weak weapon" for the EPA
to use because their flyways cover
most of the United States, and the
birds tend to alight almost anywhere." Thus, the court may view
the migratory bird rule as a limitless, and therefore unusable, approach. However, the effect Lopez

will have is uncertain for a number
of reasons. Although Lopez puts
questions on the constitutionality of
isolated wetlands regulation, the
federal judiciary's treatment of
Lopez since itwas announced raises
questions ofwhether the Supreme
Court would remain completely
faithful to its 1995 decision."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Wilson court first considered the issue of whether the

regulation exceeded Congress' delegation of authority in extending the
definition of "waters of the United
States" to include "those waters
whose degradation 'could affect'
interstate commerce."" While the
defendants in Wilson ("Defendants") did not challenge the Act's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, they did challenge
the jury instructions and regulations
as both exceeding Congress' delegation of authority to the Corps of
Engineers under the Act and Con-

gress' power under the Commerce
Clause. 0 The court held that the
regulation was ultra vires, but chose
not to reach the issue of the limits
of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause." It stated that
resolving the regulation issue was
dispositive to the issue ofthe Commerce Clause and that it need not
undertake to answer the "difficult
questions" regarding the limits of
congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause.'
At trial, the instructions allowed the jury to convict ifit found
that Defendants' activities affected
interstate commerce. If those activities affected interstate commerce, they could be reached by
the regulations under the Act. For
instance, if the jury could find that
"fish or shellfish are or could be
taken" from the waters and sold in
interstate commerce, then the government had established a sufficient
connection with interstate commerce to apply the regulation."

4

1d at 197.
Id
86
See general/v Riverside Bavview Homes. 474 U.S. 121.
85

87

Holman., supra note 25. at 197.
"Judge Luttig's concurrence in if7/son emphasizes that the 4th Circuit has dismissed Lopez. See J'il/son. 133 F.3d at 266.
and also infra note 109.
' 911lson, 133F.3d at 255.
901d at 257.
91
1d at 256-57.
92

1d

93

1d. at 256. The instructions regarding the regulation read: "The government must prove that these waters have some
potential connection with interstate commerce. If you find, ladies and gentlemen, beyond a reasonable doubt that these
waters were or could be used by visitors from other states for recreational or other purposes, or that fish or shellfish are or
could be taken from these waters and sold in interstate or foreign commerce. or that these waters were used or could have
been used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce, or that these waters were subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide or that the use, degradation or construction [sic] [destruction?] of such waters could affect interstate commerce.
then Iinstruct you as a matter of law that the government has established such connection with interstate commerce and that
these waters, including wetlands. are waters of [the] United States." Id.

The Court of Appeals
found this set of instructions flawed.
It found that interpreting "waters of
the United States" as waters whose
use potentially affected interstate
commerce was contrary to the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence on the
CWA." The Act prohibits the discharge, without a permit, of pollutants into "navigable waters."9 The
Act then defines "navigable waters"
as "waters ofthe United States."96
The court noted that the Supreme
Court ruled that by defining "navigable waters" as "'waters of the
United States,' Congress intended
'to exercise its powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate at
least some waters that would not
be deemed 'navigable' under the
classical understanding of that
term. "'"Thus, it was not disputed
that the regulation may extend to
some waters that are not in fact
"navigable." In addition, Lopez en-

sured that Congress could regulate
discharges of pollutants that "substantially affect interstate commerce. " However, the court found
that the regulation surpassed even
this broad interpretation."
Hesitating to embark on a
discussion ofcongressional authority under the Commerce Clause, the
court noted that the Supreme Court
has changed its view regarding
some issues of federalism.'o Because the object ofthe controversy
was an administrative regulation and
not a statute, the court stated that it
could avoid the constitutionally
troubling Commerce Clause issue,
that would have been presented had
the facts surrounded a statute.'
The court explained that because a
similarly-worded statute would certainly appear to contradict recent
Supreme Court rulings, a situation
involving such a statute would be

much harder to deal with.102

Limits of Wetland Regulation
The court struck the rule as
exceeding the scope of Congress'
delegation.'o3 It explained that a
constitutionally troubling regulation
did not impose as formidable an
obstacle for it to dispose ofas such
a statute would have, although it did
not elaborate as to why. In striking
the rule, the court asserted that "absent a clear indication to the contrary, we should not lightly presume
that merely by defining 'navigable
waters' as 'the waters of the United
States' . .. Congress authorized
the Army Corps of Engineers to
assert its jurisdiction in such a
sweeping and constitutionally troubling manner."' 4 Not only did the
regulation's definition surpass what
could be interpreted as "navigable
waters," it even reached beyond
what could be regarded as "closely
related to navigable or interstate
waters."o' The court held that by
defining "navigable waters" so

94

1d at 258.
"Id at 257.
96Id
97

1d. at 256 (quotingU.S.

v Riverside Bavview Homes. Inc., 474 U.S. 121. 133 (1985)).

98Id

(quotingU.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 558-59 (1995)).
991d at 258.
'oold at 256 (citing Printzv U.S., I17 S.Ct. 2365 (1997): SeininoleTribe v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). U.S. v.Lopez. 514 U.S. 549

(1995); andNew Yorkv. U.S.. 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
'Id at 257.
02

Id

'Id.
10

Id.
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broadly, the regulation went too tar.
It ruled that the Corps ofEngineers
exceeded its authority under the
CWA in promulgating 33 C.F.R.
§328.3(a)(3) and thus, the rule was
invalid. '0

Wilson court's ruling makes sense It reasoned that wetlands conbut further muddied the water. It nected to navigable waters on the
effectively applies the spirit ofLopez basis ofhydrological cycles and the
to the CWA, but altered the Su- flow ofwater through ecosystems
preme Court's ruling on wetlands are sufficient to fall under the purin Riverside Bayview Homes. In view ofthe Act.'0 As in Riverside
sum, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bayview Homes, the wetlands in
V. CONWEuF
Wilson raised questions that stand Wilson flowed through hydrologiAt some point, the Su- in need of resolution by the Su- cal cycles to navigable waterpreme Court should consider the preme Court.
ways. "0 Thus, the facts of Wilson
issue presented in Wilson. AssessWilson seemed to stray seemed strikingly similar to Rivering jurisdiction under the CWA and from the Supreme Court's CWA side Bayview Homes, although
its regulations is a fact-intensive de- jurisprudence in Riverside some inconsistencies appeared."'
termination. The facts of Wilson Bayview Homes. In that case, the The court did not adequately exwere distinct from those of prior Supreme Court pronounced that plain how the facts of Wilson were
cases and amplify the problems wetlands may be regulated if adja- distinguishable from those ofRivthey raised. In light ofthe Supreme cent to a navigable body of wa- erside Bayview Homes.
0 The Court evaluated
Court's developing Commerce ter.o'
adjaThe facts of Wilson were
Clause jurisprudence and federal cency according to the broad mean- clearly distinguishable from Leslie
case law concerning the regulation ing of"navigable waters" that Con- Salt and Hoffman Homes. In
of wetlands under the CWA, the gress intended the Act to have.'0 o Leslie Salt, the wetland was iso06Id Eachjudge
on the panel filed an opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion of the court, while Judge Luttig
concurred in the judgment and filed a separate opinion. Judge Payne, a district court judge sitting by designation,
concurred in part of the Court's opinion and in the judgment, but also filed a separate opinion. Judge Niemeyer's opinion
is divided into seven parts as outlined below:
I.Facts and evidence presented
II.Jurisdiction of the regulation - "navigable waters"
III. Jury instructions regarding wetlands and interstate waters
IVSidecasting issue
V.Mens rea jury instruction
VI. Admissibility of expert testimony
Vl.Conclusion

Amajority of the panel adopted parts II, V and VI as well as the ultimate judgment. Judge Luttig only concurred in the
ultimate judgment and only for the reasons stated in Part V Although he believed that Judge Niemeyer's analysis in Part II
was "convincing." he nevertheless declined to adopt it. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 266. He felt that itdirectly conflicted with the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Brzonkala v.Virginia Polytechnic &State University, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir 1997). Id In his brief
statement. Judge Luttig asserted that the Circuit has dismissed Lopez as an "aberration" and limited it to its specific facts.
Id. In Brzonkala.,the Court held that the Violence Against Women Act did not exceed congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause. See generally Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949. Judge Luttig was on the Brzonkala panel and dissented in its

judgment. Ifi/son, 133 F 3d at 266. Since filson was handed down, the Circuit has granted a motion for rehearing in
Brzonkala.

Judge Payne adopted Parts II, V,and VI of Judge Niemeyer's opinion and voiced his own views on coverage of both
adjacent wetlands and sidecasting under the Act. Id at 266-75.
07Riverside

Bayview Hones,474 U.S. at 131.

'osM. at 132-35.
'0l. at 134.
"oSee Wilson, 133 F.3dat 254-55.
..'Id. at 254. The facts of Wilson are not entirely clear. For instance, the wetlands at issue were not part of the Zekiah

Swamp, although they were nearby Id. Also, although the case mentions a drainage pattern through intermittent streams

lated until altered by artificial
means.112 In Hoffman Homes, the
wetland at issue was completely
isolated, separate from any other
water source or body."I The wetland at issue in Wilson was clearly
different in that it was not isolated
in the same sense as the areas in
both Leslie Salt and Hoffman
Homes. Thus, itseems that the Wilson court changed the recipe - it

took facts similar to Riverside
Bayview Homes and applied
Lopez-like reasoning.Leslie Salt
and Hoffman Homes held that the
mere presence of migratory waterfowl justified regulation under the

Commerce Clause.114 Lopez
seemed to conflict with these
cases."' Under Lopez, the appropriate question for a court to ask in
considering the constitutionality of
CWA regulations was whether they
substantially affected interstate commerce." 6 This was what the Fourth
Circuit did in Wilson. "' It logically
applied the reasoning ofLopez to
wetland regulation under the CWA
In doing so, however, it created
friction with the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits as well as Supreme Court
precedent on wetlands, and thus it
presented an issue that the Supreme

Court snoulo resolve.
The Wilson court's decision

also created some additional confusion. The court commented that
Congress' far-reaching power to
regulate waters that are, in fact, not
navigable "could be drawn into
question by the [Supreme] Court's

recent federalism jurisprudence.""'
But then the Court collected itself
and dismissed the point itjust made,
saying, "we need not resolve these
difficult questions about the extent
and limits of congressional power
to regulate non-navigable waters to
resolve the issue before us.""' One
might ask then, why did the court
bring it up to begin with? Such a
remark only serves to encourage
skepticism on the constitutionality
ofthe Act's provision and how it
should be interpreted by courts regarding all wetlands under the
Commerce Clause. But perhaps this
is precisely what the court had in
mind.
Were the Supreme Court
to apply a Lopez analysis to regulation of isolated wetlands under the
CWA, it is likely that such a regulation would not be sustained.120 According to one scholar, the Supreme Court would begin by inquir-

Limits of Wetland Regulation
ing as to whether the relevant portions of the CWA regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.121 It would likely
conclude that while the Act as a
whole does bear some relation to
commerce or an economic enterprise, "it must be admitted that the
Act does not concern itself solely
with the 'regulation of economic
activity. "'122 For example, the Court
would likely view regulation ofisolated wetlands as having no connection with interstate commerce,
because they are totally intrastate
and bear no impact on navigable
waterways used as channels of
commerce. The migratory bird rule
could establish an economic connection between isolated wetlands
and interstate commerce, but a
Lopez-governed court would likely
analogize the happenstance landing
of birds that fly over state lines to
the potential travel ofguns over state
lines to rule that such a connection
is insufficient to establish Commerce
Clause jurisdiction. Whether the
Supreme Court would remain true
to Lopez in considering the constitutionality ofregulating isolated wetlands under the CWA is another
question.

and creeks, it fails to mention if these were navigable. Id Thus, it is unknown just how isolated the wetlands were from a
navigable waterway.
" 2 Leslie Salt, 896 F.2dat 356.
" 3 Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d at 1311, 1314.
"4 See Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
'5See generallyLopez, 514 U.S. 549.
'"See ifIlson, 133 F.3d at 256.
"Id. at 256-57.

"'Id at 256.
"I9 d.

120Holman, supra note 25, at 198.
21
' Id at 197.
122Id at 198.
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The Wilson court's decision
is unclear in another aspect. In reasoning that the regulation defining
"waters ofthe United States" is invalid, the court stated that it had no
reason to believe Congress would
authorize such a constitutionally
troubling interpretation as the
agency had given." The court
stated:
[w]ere this regulation a statute,
duly enacted by Congress, it
would present serious constitutional difficulties, because, at
first blush, it would appear to
exceed congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
This regulation is not, however,
a statute. 124
It is a well-established
statutory canon of construction that
a court should, if possible, interpret a statute so as not to violate
the Constitution. Apparently, the
Wison court said that it had no such
duty regarding administrative rules.
Such a pronouncement seemed to
conflict, however, with the Chevron doctrine, that when Congress
has not spoken to the matter, an
agency's construction of its authorizing statute should enjoy great deference. 2 2 The court could have
decided, under Chevron, that the
regulation was an unreasonable
construction of the CWA, in that it
was unreasonable to say that the
EPA may regulate all wetlands,
even seasonal pools of water, under the term "navigable waters."

Instead, it struck the regulation in a reaffirm Lopez in the wetlands conway that appeared to conflict with text.
Chevron. The court would have
done better to either elaborate and
explain its point or omit italtogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit has now
ruled to prohibit regulation of intrastate, non-adjacent wetlands under the CWA. In so doing, it applied the Supreme Court's revised
jurisprudence limiting congressional
authority under the Commerce
Clause. This decision was novel
because it broke from prior Supreme Court precedent as well as
recent federal court rulings regarding wetland regulation. It underscored the inherent conflict between
the reasoning ofRiverside Bayview
Homes and the philosophy of
Lopez Lopez. This controversy is
ripe for review and should be resolved by the Supreme Court in
order to establish a coherent national policy.
When given a chance to
address the issue in Wilson, the Supreme Court should stay true to its
decision in Lqpez. It should rule that
intrastate, isolated wetlands, because they do not substantially affect interstate commerce, fall outside federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause. Such a ruling
would go far to clear up the Court's
occluded CWA and Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Ifthe Court
is truly committed to strengthening
federalism and reigning inCongress'
Commerce Clause authority, itmust

23

' Jfflson, 133 F.3d at 257.

124Id.

125For an authoritative explanation of the Chevron doctrine, see I KENNETH CuLP DAVIS &RIcHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
TIVE LAw TREAIE
i §3.1-3.6 (3ded. 1994).
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